The recent round of enlargement has provided new impetus for the study of European Union (EU) external borders. This article conceptualizes the emerging European border regime as a composite policy, arguing that the regime is shaped by policy-making across such diverse areas as Regional Policy, Justice and Home Affairs, Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement. It shows that different policy paradigms attribute diverging functions to the EU external border and prescribe different modes of governance and diverse patterns of openness and control. The policy process producing the border regime is therefore both vertically and horizontally fragmented, reflecting interests, perceptions, norms, structures and procedures at various levels of authority (supranational, national, local) and in different policy sectors. This fragmentation results in a differentiated and uneven border strategy marked by diverse patterns of inclusion and exclusion, as illustrated by three case studies representing variations from the common European standard.
Introduction
The ongoing transformation of the European Union (EU) has given rise to new debates about territoriality and borders. The recent round of enlargement shifted the EU external border further east, multiplying its length, increasing diversity and creating new neighbours and neighbourhoods. The deepening of integration has increasingly shifted responsibility for border management to the European level, where hybrid policy regimes combine intergovernmental and supranational features (Monar, 2001) . The functional widening of integration has been accompanied by increasing policy fragmentation that has created inconsistencies and contradictions in management of the external borders. Finally, the prospect of further enlargement suggests that the EU must be conceptualized as an evolving entity with 'mobile' borders. Driven by these developments, the debate on the new external border has been shaped by a range of perspectives, including governance, policy process, international relations and geopolitics (Monar, 2001; Wolczuk, 2002; Favell and Hansen, 2002; Williams and Balaz, 2002; Lavenex, 2004; Walters, 2004) .
In this article, we address the question of what kind of border regime is being constructed and how geopolitical space at the new EU external border will be organized. It characterizes the emerging border regime in terms of the functions attributed to the border, the mode of governance and the degree of openness of the border regime. It does so by detecting and analysing the arguments and positions of key policy actors, expressed in policy documents and speeches, and critically examining implementation practices in diverse national settings. The analysis shows that no single European policy line has emerged, and the border regime is best described as a composite policy negotiated among policy-makers who operate in different policy paradigms that give rise to highly diverging perceptions and policy prescriptions. Three policy paradigms in particular have major implications for the external borders: Schengen provisions in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), cross-border cooperation under Regional Policy and, finally, Enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The result of this vertically and horizontally fragmented policy process is a border strategy characterized by internal contradictions and a lack of coherence.
The contribution of this article is two-fold. First, it advances a conceptualization of the EU external borders that goes beyond simple dichotomies (open/closed, fixed/fuzzy, supranationally/nationally controlled) and normative prescriptions. Employing the novel concept of a composite policy, the article seeks to describe and explain the complex realities of EU external border construction. Second, this article is among the first studies to adopt a post-enlargement perspective. While most existing studies address problems in EU-15 policies towards the Central and Eastern European applicant countries (Grabbe, 2000; Zielonka, 2001) , this study assumes a more stable division between insiders and outsiders. It factors in recent initiatives such as the ENP, which constitutes a combined and multi-faceted 'geostrategy' (and/or paradigm shift) introducing novel principles and instruments likely to significantly transform the debate about the nature of EU external borders.
Conceptualizing Border Regimes
Put simply, a border regime is a system of control, regulating behaviour at the borders. Any attempt to analyse the emerging EU border regime must begin by identifying analytical focal points, or key variables, that can be used to characterize such a regime. Some focal points are immediately evident from the existing literature. Zielonka (2001) focuses on two dimensions, including the degree of openness and the mode of governance (intergovernmental or communitarian). His matrix yields four ideal types of border regime, labelled 'liberal internationalism', 'imperial neomedievalism', 'parochial nationalism' and 'Westphalian superstatism' (Zielonka, 2001: 516) . Others, notably Walters (2004) , call our attention to representational and discursive aspects of borders and border regimes. Employing a constructivist perspective, Walters shows how competing geostrategies are constructed in response to 'particular geographies of unease and insecurity ' (2004: 677) .
Borrowing from these two studies, our analysis focuses on three important characteristics of the external border: the type of functions attributed to the border, the mode of governance associated with management of the border and the degree of openness of the border regime. Functionally, borders are constitutive of social action, providing both constraints and incentives (Paasi, 1996) . Borders can be seen as ends or barriers, or as passages, filters or gateways between systems contiguous to each other (O'Dowd and Wilson, 1996) . According to Eva (1998) , borders have, throughout history, had the function of 'selection' -they are conceptual and concrete points of reference for establishing what is internal and what is external, what can come in and what must stay out. The logic of this selection is inevitably socially constructed -the creation of borders can thus be regarded as a process through which 'imagined communities' (Anderson, 1983 ) define their 'imagined territories'. Any attempt to explain the construction of EU external borders should, therefore, inquire about the functions the border regime is designed to serve.
Another important characteristic of the emerging border regime is its mode of governance, which can range from intergovernmental cooperation to purely supranational decision-making. Control over borders has traditionally been an important attribute of the nation-state, intimately linked to issues of sovereignty and independence. The continuing Europeanization of border policies creates questions about an appropriate division of competences among the various levels of authority, and about implications for state sovereignty as well as the nature of the EU itself. Thus, a supranationally controlled border regime can be seen as an important step towards federal Europe or even the construction of a 'Westphalian superstate' (Zielonka, 2001) .
Finally, EU external borders can be characterized in terms of their permeability or degree of openness. Indeed, the debate about soft or hard, open or closed, fixed or fuzzy borders has been central to the literature on EU territoriality (Favell and Hansen, 2002; Kennard, 2003; Kazmierkiewicz, 2004) . Openness, however, is not easy to operationalize, as the rules and ease of border-crossing typically vary across different categories of people, countries and goods. Different bordering and de-bordering practices exist simultaneously and create complex patterns. Openness, thus, is a relative term made meaningful by comparisons of implementation practices over time and across specific border contexts.
How can the emerging regime on EU external borders be described? What functions is it designed to perform? Is border management a predominantly intergovernmental or communitarian affair, and how open or closed is the new external border? In the next sections we argue that no single border strategy has prevailed, and that the EU external border regime remains highly contested along all three dimensions.
EU Border Regime as a Product of Composite Policy
When studying the construction of the EU external border regime, an analyst is immediately faced with the problem of multiple discourses. The external border lies at the intersection of distinctive policy paradigms and different actors advance conflicting policy arguments and divergent assessments of opportunities and threats. This view is confirmed by the existing literature.
A number of studies have shown that the management of EU external borders has been characterized by policy fragmentation, institutional polycentrism and inadequate cross-pillar coordination (den Boer and Wallace, 2000; Stetter, 2004) . These studies show that policies with direct impact on the external border serve a bewildering range of objectives, such as ensuring socio-economic cohesion, resolving complex interdependencies, expanding the area of freedom, security and justice, and promoting reform and common values in the EU immediate neighbourhood. Policies relevant to the external border are made in diverse institutional settings, decisionmaking forums, policy paradigms and conceptual frameworks. The parallel incrementalism that has characterized the evolution of different policies has contributed to the lack of coordination and coherence.
In an attempt to make sense of the situation, we borrow the notion of a 'composite policy' from Sedelmeier (2002) . He defines a composite policy as 'a broad policy framework, which draws its substance from distinctive policy decisions' across a range of policy areas (Sedelmeier, 2002: 630-1) . A composite policy is characterized by the fact that specific parts of the policy are produced by different groups of policy-makers whose preferences are shaped by sectoral policy paradigms, defined as 'sets of ideas that respectively underpin policy in specific areas' (Sedelmeier, 2002: 629) .
We argue that the notion of 'composite policy' aptly describes the nature of the EU border strategy, which draws its substance from three distinct policy paradigms. These include the Schengen provisions in Justice and Home Affairs, cross-border cooperation under Regional Policy and, finally, Enlargement and the ENP. All three policy sectors are outgrowths of the single market programme and can be conceptualized as spillover effects of economic integration (see Figure 1) .
External Borders at the Intersection of Three Policy Paradigms
In the debates on the nature of the EU external borders, authors such as Grabbe (2000) and Mitsilegas (2002) highlight the construction of walls that may turn the EU into a gated community based on a strict distinction between 'us' and 'them'. Others, such as Zielonka (2001) and Kazmierkiewicz (2004) , warn that hard borders are not sustainable. This leads us to believe that participants in the debate attribute fundamentally different meanings to key terms such as 'single market' and 'internal security', constituting insurmountable obstacles to crossing the divide. However, border-erecting and border-crossing strategies need not be mutually exclusive, but can be applied simultaneously by various actors at different levels of governance. Our article purposefully emphasizes the complexity of the emerging border regime. We argue that the diverse border policies do not lend themselves to elegant theorizing or fit within neat conceptual categories. Instead, our analysis represents the synthesis of these approaches, all of which, in a way, illuminate the different aspects of the same underlying phenomenon. Three policy paradigms with direct implications for borders illustrate this vacillation between economic and security imperatives and between incentives for greater openness or control. The following sections elaborate on the fragmented and 'composite' nature of the emerging border regime, discussing the various functions that different policy paradigms attribute to the border, the mode of governance (supranational/intergovernmental) they advocate, and the degree of openness that results from these different constraints and incentives.
Locus of Cooperative Initiatives
The EU Regional Policy represents the oldest policy paradigm with direct implications for borders and borderlands. It has its origins in the Treaty of Rome, which promoted 'a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion' (Treaty Establishing the EC, 1957 (Bache, 1998) . After several reforms, cross-border (Phare-CBC, Tacis), transnational and inter-regional cooperation (Interreg) still constitutes a major instrument for diminishing huge income differences across the EU external border (George and Bache, 2001 ). Apparently, regional policy has implications for borders because it seeks to promote socio-economic development in border regions through intensifying cross-border contacts and interaction. Greater openness and closer interaction with neighbours are seen as a remedy that will boost economic development in the EU peripheral hinterlands.
From the perspective of regional policy, then, the emerging border regime must be in line with the EU strategic objective of reducing inequality, division and exclusion. This logic portrays the external border as a joint responsibility and the locus of new cooperative practices, rather than being a line that divides a zone of confrontation. As phrased by Jauhiainen (2002) , the policy of frontiere coupure in which the border is a separating factor is replaced by the policy of frontiere couture, which sees the border region as an integrative factor.
This reasoning is clearly evident also from policy rhetoric: Guy Crauser, the Director General for Regional Policy, describes cross-border cooperation as a function which 'allows border regions to take full advantage of the single market'. 1 The strive for cohesion is seen as even more important, since the future of the EU is perceived as 'an almost continuous process of enlargement', which implies the accession of countries with lower levels of development.
2 Similarly, the ex-Commissioner for Regional Policy, Michel Barnier, has emphasized the promotion of expanding European territoriality as a priority for governance that 'removes borders and creates synergies' and succeeds through extending cross-border cooperation. 3 In a similar vein, Commission's communication to the member states warns that national borders should not become a barrier to the balanced development and integration of the European territory (European Commission, 2000) . It recognizes shortcomings such as the presence of borders that cut off border communities from each other and hinder the coherent management of eco-systems. But it hardly recognizes the fact that most of the funding under various CBC initiatives has been directed at the member-state organizations without actually crossing the border, thus having strong implications for EU territoriality (see, e.g., Scott, 2000) . Moreover, Commission has not been able to remove real barriers and take full advantage of the borderless space, since different community initiatives originate in various institutional settings (Interreg in DG Regional Policy, Phare CBC in DG Enlargement and Tacis in DG External Relations) (Kennard, 2002 (Kennard, , 2003 .
The image of the border regime as European-designed and state-controlled (Jauhiainen, 2002 ) also reveals conflicts of interests among the various levels of authority. In particular, the tendency of EU Regional Policy to empower subnational actors becomes problematic in the border regions, where the security concerns of national authorities may conflict with local demands for more open, economy-boosting border regimes. In the case of such conflicts, it is likely that 'high politics' will prevail over 'low politics' and national priorities over local ones. While the communitarized approach offers an optimistic vision of intensified cross-border contacts, it is important to keep in mind that CBC instruments remain controlled by member states in a context largely determined by the quality of existing bilateral relations.
Foci of Control and Containment Procedures
The Schengen Agreement, signed in 1985, ushered in a second policy paradigm with major implications for borders. 4 Similar to Regional Policy, it serves the objective of completing the single market programme, but with an emphasis on security rather than cohesion. To reduce the risks associated with the free movement of people, the EU has strengthened controls at the external borders, harmonized visa, asylum and migration policies, created the Schengen Information System (SIS), and enhanced cooperation between police, immigration and judicial authorities. The 'selection function', closely associated with the threat of terrorism and the securitization of immigration, is central to policies in the Justice and Home Affairs domain. Harmonized visa policies act as 'a tool for letting in those who bring wealth, and at the same time keeping out those who bring burden' (Kramsch et al., 2004) . When entering the Schengen zone, nationals from the suspicious 'black list' countries are separated from the rest and subjected to thorough control. Common standards in treating asylum applications under the 'first host country' and 'safe third country' principles emphasize collective responsibility for gate-keeping. 6 The prevailing rhetoric both in the Council and in the Commission emphasizes the importance of readmission agreements and well-coordinated 'joint return operations', which provide more order to the movements of asylum seekers on the European continent. The thrust of European-level governance on immigration, thus, presupposes closing the backdoor firmly while leaving the front door partly open for legal migration where that is in the interests of Europe and takes account of the development needs of countries of origin.
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A glance at the mode of governance in this policy sector suggests that the EU is quickly moving towards supranational regulation of its external borders. Europeanization of border legislation is evident from the incorporation of the Schengen treaty in the acquis communautaire and the transfer of issues related to migration, asylum and visa policies into the first pillar (den Boer and Wallace, 2000; Monar, 2001) , with proposals to establish a Common European Border Corps, no longer controlled or accountable at the national level (European Commission, 2002) .
However, the intergovernmental origins of JHA cooperation are clearly evident from a series of compromises and national opt-outs. In addition, the responsibility for implementation, including the actual control and surveillance of external borders, rests with national border authorities. The existing acquis leaves room for a significant degree of national discretion: for instance, Article 6 of the Schengen Convention provides that checks in accordance with uniform principles are carried out 'within the scope of national powers and national law and taking account of the interests of all contracting parties'. Member states are free to entrust checks and surveillance at external borders to the authorities of their choice, according to their own national structures (Council of the EU, 2002) . Thus, the 'area of freedom, security and justice' represents a 'novel mixture of community and intergovernmental characteristics' and is marked by a high degree of differentiation (Monar, 2001: 763) .
Although, functionally, much of the selection network takes the shape of a paper monster, 'a more integrated management of the external borders of the Union is fundamental to the area of freedom, security and justice'. 8 Despite the fact that the image of Fortress Europe (see Geddes, 2000) is often regarded as an exaggerated cliché, the idea of constructing an exclusive zone of order and safety, separated from the unstable and untrustworthy outside by effectively policed borders, continues to shape policy-making under the internal security agenda. 9 While the costs of control and surveillance are covered from national budgets, EU institutions play a supportive role. In particular, European institutions have sought to reinforce the capacity of the new member states, investing in equipment, the training of border guards and in promoting joint operations of old and new member states 'in order to guarantee that we all share the same standards of border control'.
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Limits of External Governance
Finally, a third policy paradigm has developed around enlargement and the emerging ENP (European Commission, 2003) . In contrast to Schengen, which presupposes a clearly delineated entity with hard external borders, this paradigm regards borders as fluid and mobile. Formulated to serve the EU broader geopolitical objectives in its new 'near abroad', the vision offers the neighbours 'everything but the institutions' in return for tangible progress in implementing internal reforms.
Central to the neighbourhood paradigm is the notion of conditionalitya system of sticks and carrots in which soft and open borders constitute a reward for progress in meeting European standards. Well-behaving neighbours can count on 'better market opportunities in a more stable economic and political environment'; 11 however, it remains doubtful whether conditionality will work in the absence of the accession carrot (Grabbe, 2004) . Apparently, this policy-setting seeks to expand the 'legal boundary' of the Union with only limited openings of its 'institutional boundary' (Lavenex, 2004) . Despite the fact that conditionality inevitably produces asymmetric neighbourhood relations and a differentiated border regime, the ENP constitutes a more integrated approach to border management, as it aims to combine both external and internal policy objectives in a coherent framework, avoiding push-and-pull factors from opposing directions.
Borders serve important functions in the expansion of the Union and in the emerging schemes of external governance. Driven by the recognition that 'the EU cannot go on enlarging forever', 12 the ENP is designed to serve the Union's wider geopolitical objectives in its immediate postenlargement neighbourhood. On the one hand, the EU's interest in increas-ing its leverage in the neighbourhood reflects the recognition of political and economic interdependence with the neighbours. On the other hand, the new policy initiatives appear to be driven by feelings of insecurity:
We will have new neighbours and longer borders with old ones, and at the same time, we will be getting nearer to zones of present and recent insecurity. 13 This new policy agenda moves EU towards external governance as parts of the acquis communautaire are extended to non-member states. It offers the neighbours a stake in the single market and the four freedoms, but this openness is conditional on commitment to common values, rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, and adherence to principles of market economy and sustainable development, as well as 'certain essential aspects of the EU's external action' (European Commission, 2004) . The intent to enlarge the EU's legal boundary is a strategic attempt to gain control over policy developments in the immediate neighbourhood (Lavenex, 2004) .
Recognizing the diversity of the EU's post-enlargement neighbourhood, ENP recommends 'tailor-made' measures, bilateral initiatives and customized action plans for each neighbour. Atypically, the EU has both the incentive to project stability and prosperity beyond its borders and the intention and capacity to do so. At the same time, the categories of 'beyond' and the quality of bilateral relations offered to non-members vary and create new borders outside the EU (Berg and van Meurs, 2002) . The ENP thus promotes differentiation along the external border, operating selectively to establish an uneven relationship characterized by varying degrees of openness in different sections.
As demonstrated earlier, EU borders become important instruments in these paradigmatic schemes of cooperative initiatives, control and containment procedures and external governance, determining inclusion and exclusion practices in line with the logic of the single market. According to this logic, the realization of the four freedoms leads to the abolition of border controls on internal borders. To compensate for the security risks associated with free movement inside the EU, tighter control of the external border becomes necessary. However, a fixed and hard external border is inconsistent with the imperatives of enlargement, while also hindering economic development in the borderlands, creating pressure for more openness. Thus, each policy paradigm attributes its own functions to the border, while the final design depends largely on implementation practices under the advocated mode of governance. What we see emerging is a composite policy, which originates from distinctive policy decisions based on economic incentives, security prerequisites and conditionality across a range of policy areas.
Implementation of Border Practices
Many studies point out that the EU's increasingly dominant security agenda has caused border-erecting practices to prevail over the liberalizing tendencies (see, e.g., Grabbe, 2000; Mitsilegas, 2002 ) and a sizeable literature laments the negative consequences of Schengen on the new member states, arguing that rigid EU regulations conflict with CEE interests and result in a new 'paper curtain' that cuts across traditional cross-border economic, political, social and kinship ties (Favell and Hansen, 2002; Kennard, 2003; Kazmierkiewicz, 2004) . While these concerns are valid, the reality is more complex, as actors' preferences vary and different re-bordering and de-bordering practices exist simultaneously.
We propose that openness is dependent on the actors' implementation practices, which are context-specific. In other words, the overarching function of the border regime is to guarantee a pattern of inclusion and exclusion that corresponds to the interests and priorities of the Community and the member states. However, visions of what this pattern should look like vary across policy paradigms, as well as actors involved. Owing to the significant degree of national discretion in implementing EU norms and standards, the degree of openness is not uniform along the entire external border but depends heavily on specific historical, political and institutional contexts. In order to illustrate this diversity, we look at three cases that represent variations from the common European standard of practised functions and governance. Pairs of countries (soon to be) divided by the EU external border -Estonia and Russia, Romania and Moldova and Spain and Morocco -have each invented ways to provide for greater openness of the border than the acquis envisions.
Bilateralism
After the restoration of Estonian independence in 1991, Estonia's 339-km Eastern border with the Russian Federation became laden with a range of functions crucial for consolidating sovereignty and statehood. A 'strong' Eastern border was seen as an important security prerequisite for completing separation from Russia, guaranteeing territorial control, ending the massive influx of Russian-speaking migrants, and keeping out organized crime, drug trafficking and smuggling. In light of the generally strained nature of Estonian-Russian bilateral relations, it is not surprising that these exclusionary functions remain central to the border regime today (Ehin and Berg, 2004) . As an EU member state, Estonia has a closely monitored and increasingly well-equipped eastern border, a complete visa regime with Russia, and very limited immigration regulated by strict quotas.
This hard border regime, however, had one soft spot. Responding to local demands for more flexible border-crossing arrangements in the context of existing interdependencies, a simplified border-crossing regime on the Estonian-Russian border was in effect between 1991 and 2000. Under this regime, certain residents of the border regions (about 17,000 to 20,000 in total) were allowed to cross the border without visas. Although the regime was terminated in 2000 in response to European pressure, a new substitute arrangement was soon drawn up. Despite the perceived security risks, Estonia signed a bilateral agreement with Russia which stipulated that both sides could issue up to 4000 multiple-entry visas a year to border-region residents who had a compelling need to cross the border on a regular basis.
14 These visas have been issued free of charge and are valid for one year.
Both Estonia and Russia have followed this practice for the past four years, renegotiating the number, costs and conditions of the visas every year. These arrangements are in compliance with the Community's legal framework on external borders. They are also consistent with the ideas of preserving 'the cohesiveness of border communities' and ensuring balanced development while reducing inequality, division and exclusion. Interestingly, this practice may be a precursor of a general tendency to create more favourable and flexible conditions for the residents of European border regions.
Responding to concerns about 'paper curtains' in the enlarged EU, the Commission has put forward a proposal to establish a local border traffic regime at the external land borders of the member states, and to authorize them to conclude or maintain bilateral agreements with neighbouring third countries for that purpose. It foresees a specific 'L-type' (local) multipleentry visa that would be limited to the border area of the issuing member state, with the maximum duration of the stay of seven consecutive days in that area and with the validity of one to five years. In this context, a 'border area' is defined as extending up to 50 km from the border (Council of the EU, 2004) .
While this regulation establishes a Community regime as a mode of governance for local border traffic, the implementation is delegated to member states that may draw up respective bilateral agreements. It provides an element of much-desired flexibility, since it leaves the interpretation of the border functions as well as the governing practices to the countries concerned. But it also opens up the external borders in a way that enables third-country nationals entering the EU with an 'L-type' visa to land in Paris or Rome instead of staying within the 50-km limit of the external border. In the absence of internal check-points, there is nothing to keep these borderlanders within the prescribed zone of 'flexible interaction'.
Extraterritoriality
In the process of post-Soviet transition, Moldova has ended up on the faultline between the Balkans, CEE and the Russian sphere of dominance. It is seen as a territory without its own separate nation, being a power-political construction rather than an ethnic reality -périphérie toujours provisoire. Moldova is dependent on both Western assistance (conditional on economic reforms) and Russian leverage (affecting political developments). But, above all, it is ethnic and kinship ties with Romania that define Moldova's orientation in the region. Romania's adoption and implementation of Schengen regulations in preparation for membership have produced curious outcomes, which -more often than not -have a negative impact on the neighbouring Moldova.
As a response to regional instability, the EU promotes cross-border cooperation and intra-regional free trade on the basis of bilateral agreements, while also requiring a strengthening of national border controls. The latter function seems to be prevailing, since EU external governance and pre-accession conditionality have led to the tightening of Romania's border regime with Moldova, evident, inter alia, from the fact that Moldovans now have to present passports instead of ID cards when travelling (Skvortova, 2001) . Despite its status as the most problematic post-communist candidate country, which has strong incentives to prove its readiness for accession, Romania has postponed the introduction of a visa regime with Moldova until accession.
Moldova poses a specific challenge in the JHA field because of its close connection with Romania. Assuming Romania were to join the EU in the next round of enlargement, a new permanent external border would divide Romanians and Moldavans. Whereas the Estonian and Latvian accessions have created a large group of Russian-speaking non-citizens inside the EU, Romanian accession will create extraterritoriality: a category of (potential) Romanian citizens outside the EU (Berg and van Meurs, 2002) . Every Moldovan (theoretically not only ethnic Moldovans, but all descendants of those who were Romanian citizens on 28 June 1940) has the right to apply for a Romanian passport. This creates a paradoxical situation where Schengen visa regulations could be circumvented by Moldovans applying for a Romanian (EU) passport instead of a Schengen visa! Since Moldova changed its Constitution to allow dual citizenship in 2000, some 300,000 Moldovans have applied for Romanian citizenship (Haukkala and Moshes, 2004) . Dual citizenship means that after Romania's membership, these people will be allowed to move and eventually to work freely in the EU. There will be a degree of openness unforeseen even by the ENP's Action Plan EU-Moldova, which merely refers to the need 'to initiate a dialogue on the possibilities of the visa facilitation in compliance with the acquis '. 15 This proves that despite the exclusionary rhetoric emphasizing internal security and calling for stronger cooperation in visa, migration and asylum matters, complex realities such as extraterritoriality remain a source of potential vulnerability. Despite the fact that 20% of the economically active population of Moldova has left the country, the proposed ENP Action Plan does not pose any clear objectives, benchmarks or monitoring mechanisms for stabilizing the situation (Barbarosie, 2004) . EU commitments in the region, as well as incentives offered to Moldova, remain limited or unconvincing, since ENP does not offer the prospect of membership. In this context, the extraterritorial prospect of becoming an EU citizen without joining the EU remains an attractive one.
Pretended Exclusiveness
The Hispano-Moroccan border is more than just an external border of the EU: it also demarcates divisions between Europe and Africa, North and South, First World and Third World. While the eastern border of the EU has been mobile, the prospect of EU expansion to the south remains a faint and distant one. From the European perspective, the task is one of containment in the face of a world that is viewed as profoundly alien. For Walters (2004) , the best material representation of the idea of Fortress Europe is the wall that has been built at Ceuta to defend this Spanish enclave in North Africa from migrants seeking their way into the EU.
Melilla, the other Spanish (or EU) stronghold in North Africa, is surrounded by sea and barbed wire, too. Despite Moroccan claims to the contrary, Spain continues to defend the 'Spanishness' of the city on historical, ethnic and strategic grounds. Nevertheless, over one-third of the town's population of 64,000 are Muslims from the surrounding region of Morocco (Donnan and Wilson, 1999) . Only a very small minority of this Muslim population are Spanish citizens; it has been extremely difficult for Muslims to attain Spanish nationality (unlike Moldovans vis-à-vis Romanian citizenship) or to acquire legal working papers.
The Mediterranean is not just a political, demographic and economic divide, but also an ideological and moral border perceived by Europeans as a barrier between democracy and secularism, on the one hand, and totalitarianism and religious fanaticism, on the other (Driessen, 1998) . Terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 2004 only deepened the Spanish-Moroccan split. The renewed threat of terrorism and the securitization of immigration issues have both supported the enforcement of the EU external borders in the south and influenced public opinion, which increasingly regards political and economic refugees who enter southern Europe as a heavy and unwelcome burden (Geddes, 2000) .
Yet, Spain also provides an interesting example of inclusive principles in its application of Schengen. In a declaration attached to the Accession Treaty, Spain negotiated the continuation of specific arrangements for visa exemptions for local border traffic between Ceuta and Melilla and the two Moroccan provinces that border them -Tetuan and Nador. Instead of visas, the residents of Tetuan and Nador may be granted one-year residence permits to facilitate their movements on a daily basis across the border. Moroccan nationals who are not residents in the latter provinces and who wish to enter the territory of Ceuta and Melilla shall exclusively remain subject to the visa requirement (Apap and Tchorbadjiyska, 2004) . Is that window of opportunity substantial enough to allow someone to exchange a year-long residence permit for a permanent alien status in the EU?
The Spanish enclaves in Morocco may be surrounded by barbed wire, patrolled by the Spanish Foreign Legion, but it is in fact an open border economically and socially (Donnan and Wilson, 1999) . Pretended exclusiveness is a term that aptly characterizes both sides of the coin. On the one hand, Spain contributes to the construction of Fortress Europe and to 'enlargement with security', while on the other hand it cannot ignore local pressures to open up the enclaves for more intensive interaction with the surrounding areas. In Europe, however, this practice remains unnoticed or neglected, although this 'undeclared openness' does not result from any kind of bilateral agreement between Spain and Morocco but from a special deal offered to Spain at the time of its accession.
Conclusions
Summing up, the three policy paradigms emphasize different functions of the border, thus calling for different types of border regime. As an outcome of composite policy, the emerging European border regime resists attempts to impose a neat analytical structure presupposing consistent and coherent policy-making and implementation. The level of Europeanization varies across policy settings and supranational governance remains perforated and incomplete owing to numerous national opt-outs and special deals. The intergovernmental aspects of the border regime are amplified by the fact that the responsibility for implementation rests with national governments. Therefore, descriptions of the border regime as a communitarized affair remain premature.
Second, we offer a preliminary analytical framework that focuses on three important characteristics of the external border: the type of functions attributed to the border, the mode of governance associated with the border and the degree of openness resulting from the border regime. The overarching function of the border regime is to guarantee a pattern of inclusion and exclusion that corresponds to the interests and priorities of the Community and the member states. Visions of what this pattern should look like vary across policy areas as well as actors involved. The accommodation of conflicting interests under different governance arrangements often leads to policy inconsistencies.
Third, the external border remains an extremely diverse and fragmented conceptual category. EU's new and old neighbours differ greatly in terms of their domestic structures as well as foreign policy orientations and the intensity of ties with the EU. Stretches of the external border are laden with specific meanings, collective memories and particular histories of relations and interaction. Progressive Europeanization of border management has been counterbalanced by similarly prominent instances of national selfassertion, including opt-outs from the Schengen regime or opposition to further integrative proposals. Owing to the significant degree of national discretion in implementing EU norms and standards, the degree of openness is not uniform along the length of the external border, but depends heavily on implementation of border practices in specific historical, political and institutional contexts.
Fourth, the differentiated and uneven nature of the emerging border regime is demonstrated by our case studies that represent variations from the common European standard. Pairs of countries, including Estonia and Russia, Romania and Moldova and Spain and Morocco, have each invented ways to provide for greater openness of the border than the acquis envisions. Thus, Estonia maintains liberal arrangements for local border traffic by conducting annual bilateral negotiations with Russia on the number and conditions of free multiple-entry visas. At the Romanian-Moldovan border, Moldovans may -after Romania's accession -circumvent Schengen by becoming EU citizens without joining the EU. While Spain contributes to the construction of Fortress Europe and to 'enlargement with security', it also supports intensive interaction with surrounding areas in Morocco.
Both the interpretation of border functions and the choice of feasible governing practices are left to the countries concerned.
Last, but not least, our findings suggest that the post-enlargement situation increases this diversity even more. Despite EU attempts to increase uniformity on the operational level, diverse implementation practices and specific national arrangements continue to produce differentiated outcomes. And because not all neighbours will respond positively to EU conditionality or attempts at external governance, stretches of the external border will be marked by varying degrees of openness. As a result, the emerging border regime is likely to remain uneven, differentiated and highly context-dependent also in the future.
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